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as an Aspect of Peace Support Operations 
 
Claire Breen 
 
Abstract 
This article asserts that the link between peace and security and stabilization and 
development, as exemplified by the UN-mandated international presences in Afghanistan, 
is to be welcomed but that, from the perspective of the laws governing both the use of 
force and the conduct of warfare, such an evolution is problematic for a number of 
reasons.  One, the broader functions of the military in peace support raises questions for 
jus ad bellum such as determining whether the basis for the peace enforcement has been 
achieved, as States and their armed forces engage in stabilization and state-building 
initiatives as a means to counter breaches of and threats to the peace.  Two, the broader 
functions are problematic for jus in bello as the practical application of such initiatives is 
not easily incorporated into a body of law that was drafted primarily to deal with inter-
state conflict and only provides limited guidance on internal conflict such as that in 
Afghanistan.  Consequently, international law must evolve to clarify the rights and 
obligations stemming from peace support operations for both States and their military 
personnel. 
Introduction 
Despite the legal controversy surrounding the US-led military invasion of 
Afghanistan in October 2001, Security Council resolutions passed in December of that 
year formed the legal basis for an international military presence in Afghanistan.  
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Subsequently, this presence was expanded to include a Security Council mandate to 
rebuild Afghanistan.  There are two strands to this mandate: a military strand, primarily 
in the form of the NATO-led International Stabilization Force (ISAF); and a civilian 
strand, embodied in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).  
The basis for both mandates, according to the Security Council, is to restore and maintain 
international peace and security and to assist Afghanistan to transition from a state of 
conflict to a state of peace.  In this regard, the Council‘s response may be regarded as 
peace support, comprising stabilization and state-building operations.  There are two 
questions arising from this situation.  One, if peace support is an expression of modern 
collective security measures, is peace support indicative of an evolving international law 
governing use of force (jus ad bellum)? Two, does peace support impact upon the body of 
international law governing the conduct of warfare (jus in bello) as States and their armed 
forces engage in stabilization and state-building initiatives?  Perhaps the central question 
is what, if any, legal obligations arise out of peace support missions?  
This article attempts to answer these questions, in light of New Zealand‘s peace 
support role in Afghanistan, through its deployment of Defence Force Personnel as a 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to Bamyan Province.  Although there are many 
aspects to peace support (not least use of force issues), this article will focus on economic 
and social (re)development given that such measures are a recognized, but often 
overlooked, aspect of maintaining international peace and security.  Economic and social 
development would also appear to be an increasing aspect of the responsibilities of the 
military, in spite of the fact that it would appear, on first glance, to be a role more 
appropriately assigned to the non-military.   
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This article will first consider Security Council resolutions, which form the legal 
basis of ISAF and UNAMA with particular focus on reconstruction activities as an aspect 
of international peace and security. It will then consider the international agreements 
regarding the reconstruction of Afghanistan, with particular focus upon their economic 
and social development aspects.  It will consider the significance of such developments 
for maintaining peace and security which in turn is suggestive of a more expansive 
meaning of the maintenance of international peace and security.   The article will focus 
on the work of PRTs which are more regularly engaged in functions that hitherto may 
have been regarded as being the functions of their non-military counterparts operating 
under the umbrella of UNAMA.  It will focus on the activities of the New Zealand PRT 
(NZ PRT) in this regard.  Finally, the article will consider the relationship between peace 
support activities and international humanitarian law (IHL).  It will demonstrate that the 
current laws governing use of force and the conduct of warfare are rather ill-suited to the 
ever-expanding and increasingly complex environment in which peace support operations 
operate.   
The article concludes that the link between peace and security and stabilization 
and development is to be welcomed but that such an evolution is problematic for a 
number of reasons.  One, the broader functions of the military in peace support raise 
questions for jus ad bellum such as determining whether the basis for the deployment of 
the peace enforcement operation has been achieved, as States and their armed forces 
engage in stabilization and state-building initiatives as a means to counter breaches of 
and threats to the peace.  Two, the broader functions are problematic for jus in bello as 
the practical application of such initiatives is not easily incorporated into a body of law 
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that was drafted primarily to deal with inter-state conflict and only provides limited 
guidance on internal conflict such as that in Afghanistan.  
ISAF and UNAMA: Security Council Responses to Threats  
to International Peace and Security 
In 2001, in paragraph 4 of resolution 1378, the Security Council called on 
Member States to provide long-term assistance for the social and economic 
reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan.  The outcome of this resolution was the 
establishment of an international presence in Afghanistan primarily comprising ISAF, 
which is a NATO-led security and development mission, and UNAMA, which as its title 
indicates, is a UN mission designed to assist Afghanistan to transition from conflict to 
peace.  Both presences were established by Security Council resolutions and their 
mandates were elaborated upon by the Agreement On Provisional Arrangements in 
Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, 
S/2001/1154 (the Bonn Agreement).  International intervention in Afghanistan was 
intervention into a State where human and natural forces had combined to destroy almost 
all social, physical, and economic infrastructure, leaving it without adequate roads, 
electricity, schools and hospitals (Bosi 2003). The international community recognized 
that the restoration, and maintenance, of peace and security in Afghanistan was no longer 
a case of ―bashing and whacking‖ but involved a long-term, financially well supported, 
and, quite literally, hands-on approach to rebuilding the State.  The response by the 
international community has been one of initial stabilization, followed by further 
stabilization efforts aimed at effecting a longer-term peace.  Both the short-term and 
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long-term efforts recognize and incorporate economic and social development as a core 
strategy. 
ISAF: Pacification and Stabilization Roles 
ISAF‘s mandate was established by the Bonn Agreement, Annex 1, to create a 
secure environment in and around Kabul and so that the Afghan Interim Authority and 
UN personnel could operate in a safe environment which would support the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan.  ISAF‘s focus upon counter-insurgency (pacification) and 
state-building (stabilization) across Afghanistan reflected the peace enforcement mandate 
granted to it under Chapter VII of the Charter on the determination by the Security 
Council, in 2001, that the situation in Afghanistan continued to pose a threat to 
international peace and security. ISAF member states are authorized to take all necessary 
measures to fulfill the mandate (UNSC res 1386).  The mission involves troops from 48 
nations who operate under robust rules of engagement, as well as a myriad of 
international aid agencies and private charities, private security contractors, engineers, 
development experts, political advisors and education specialists (NATO February 2011; 
Hynes, Newton Lyons and Weber 2007). 
ISAF‘s mandate was extended annually by resolutions 1413 and 1444 
respectively.  In 2003, the mandate was expanded, by resolution 1510, to assist the 
Afghan Transitional Authority in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan 
outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the Afghan authorities, as well as UN personnel 
and other international civilian personnel engaged in activities including reconstruction 
and humanitarian efforts, could operate in a secure environment, and to provide security 
assistance for the performance of other tasks in support of the Bonn Agreement.  
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Resolutions 1563 and 1623 provided for an expansion of ISAF‘s mandate in response to 
the Council‘s recognition of the constraints upon the full implementation of the Bonn 
Agreement resulting from concerns about the security situation in parts of Afghanistan.  
The Security Council‘s response to the situation in Afghanistan has continued to evolve.  
In resolution 1707, for example, the Council recognized once again the interconnected 
nature of the challenges in Afghanistan.  In reaffirming that sustainable progress on 
security, governance and development, as well as on the cross-cutting issue of counter-
narcotics, was mutually reinforcing it welcomed the continuing efforts of the Afghan 
Government and the international community to address these challenges.  In renewing 
ISAF‘s mandate in October 2010 the Council stressed yet again the central role that the 
UN continued to play in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan.  It noted in the 
context of a comprehensive approach, the synergies in the objectives of UNAMA and of 
ISAF and it stressed the need for further sustained cooperation, coordination and mutual 
support, taking due account of their respective designated responsibilities.  As in previous 
resolutions, the Council reiterated its concern at the security situation and the harmful 
consequences of violent and terrorist activities on the capacity of the Afghan Government 
to guarantee the rule of law, to provide basic services to the Afghan people, and to ensure 
the full enjoyment of their human rights and fundamental freedoms (UNSC res 1943). 
As this brief overview indicates, the core function of ISAF is to establish a secure 
environment, using all necessary force.  In effecting its mandate, ISAF has assisted the 
Afghan authorities in providing security and stability, thereby creating the conditions for 
the fulfillment of the other aspect of its mandate, which is reconstruction, development 
and effective governance as per the Bonn Agreement, the Afghan Compact, the 
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Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), the London and Kabul 
Communiqués and decisions made by the Government of Afghanistan.  The manner in 
which ISAF fulfils this aspect of its mandate is considered in more detail below. 
UNAMA: Recovery, Reconstruction and Development  
In establishing UNAMA, by resolution 1401 of March 2002, the Security Council 
reaffirmed both its previous resolutions on Afghanistan in particular resolutions 1378, 
1383, 1386 and recalled all relevant General Assembly resolutions, in particular 
resolution 56/220.  The Council also stressed, inter alia, that the provision of focused 
recovery and reconstruction assistance could greatly assist in the implementation of the 
Bonn Agreement.  According to the Secretary-General, ―Recovery and reconstruction 
efforts cannot wait the successful conclusion of the peace process, but rather their early 
and effective delivery are central to the success of the process itself‖ (A/56/875-
S/2002/278, para. 98(h)).  The emphasis on recovery and reconstruction is evident in the 
resolutions that have extended UNAMA‘s mandate on an annual basis ever since.  In 
resolution 1419, the Council called upon all Member States to provide long-term 
assistance and on-going budget support for the social and economic reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of Afghanistan as a whole.  Prior to that, in resolution 1401, the Council 
had encouraged donor countries that pledged financial aid at the Tokyo Conference on 
reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan to fulfill their commitments as soon as possible.  
When renewing UNAMA‘s mandate the following year, the Council noted, in the context 
of a comprehensive approach, the synergies in the objectives of UNAMA and ISAF, and 
stressed the need for continued cooperation and coordination. The Council called upon 
the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, including 
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ISAF and the Operation Enduring Freedom coalition (OEF), in accordance with their 
respective designated responsibilities as they evolve, to continue to address the threat to 
the security and stability of Afghanistan posed by the Taliban, Al-Qaida, other extremist 
groups and criminal activities (UNSC res 1746). 
The manner in which the Security Council has come to recognize the 
interrelationship between international peace and security and economic and social 
development, or in the case of Afghanistan, recovery, reconstruction and development, 
can be seen more recently in its extension of UNAMA‘s mandate, in March 2011.  In 
resolution 1974, the Council stressed, once again, the importance of a comprehensive 
approach to address the situation in Afghanistan and recognized that there was no purely 
military solution to ensure the stability of Afghanistan. The Council continued its 
recognition of the interconnected nature of the challenges in Afghanistan and reaffirmed 
that sustainable progress on security, governance and development, as well as the cross-
cutting issue of counter-narcotics, was mutually reinforcing.  The Council welcomed the 
continuing efforts of the Afghan Government and the international community to address 
these challenges through a comprehensive approach.  In resolution 1974, the Council also 
noted, in this context, the synergies in the objectives of UNAMA and ISAF and stressed 
the need for strengthened cooperation, coordination and mutual support. The Council 
further decided that UNAMA and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
(SRSG), operating within their mandates and guided by the principle of reinforcing 
Afghan ownership and leadership, would continue to lead the international civilian 
efforts, in accordance with their priorities as laid out in paragraph 4 of resolution 1974, as 
follows:   
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(a) promote, as co-chair of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board 
(JCMB), more coherent support by the international community to the 
Afghan Government‘s development and governance priorities, including 
through supporting the ongoing development of the new National Priority 
Programs, mobilization of resources, coordination of international donors 
and organizations, and direction of the contributions of United Nations 
agencies, funds and programs, in particular for counter-narcotics, 
reconstruction and development activities; at the same time, support 
efforts to increase the proportion of development aid delivered through the 
Afghan Government, and support efforts to increase the transparency and 
effectiveness of the Afghan Government‘s use of such resources;  
(b) strengthen the cooperation with ISAF and the NATO Senior Civilian 
Representative at all levels and throughout the country in support of the 
transition to Afghan leadership agreed to at the Kabul and London 
Conferences and the Lisbon Summit, in a sustainable manner to ensure the 
protection and promotion of the rights of all Afghans, in accordance with 
their existing mandates, in order to improve civil-military coordination, to 
facilitate the timely exchange of information and, to ensure coherence 
between the activities of national and international security forces and of 
civilian actors in support of an Afghan-led development and stabilization 
process, including through engagement with provincial reconstruction 
teams and engagement with non-governmental organizations, …. 
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Arguably, UNAMA has a strong mandate as regards human rights and economic 
and social development (Kreilkamp 2002/03), although this aspect of the mandate, like 
the mandate overall, is limited to providing assistance to the transitional authority 
(Schoiswohl 2006; A/56/875-S/2002/278).  UNAMA exemplifies the manner in which 
the Security Council has begun to move towards a much broader understanding of peace 
and security that acknowledges the significance of human rights and economic and social 
factors. UNAMA, both as a multidimensional peace operation in its own right as well as 
being an operation intertwined with ISAF, advances the doctrinal shift, first advanced in 
the Brahimi Report, of incorporating elements of peace-building into peace operations 
(O‘Flaherty 2003).  However, the actual impact of this doctrinal shift has been limited by 
the fact that donors have been slow to deliver on the generous pledges made to the 
planned recovery programs which has meant that much of its recovery programming has 
had to be scaled back in the face of insufficient funds (Griffin 2003). ISAF and UNAMA 
provide separate but entwined legal frameworks for the peace support mission in 
Afghanistan.  However, as the Security Council resolutions indicate, its peace support 
initiatives are largely dependent on upon the fulfillment of international agreements 
pertaining to Afghanistan. 
Rebuilding Afghanistan: From Security Council Resolutions  
to International Agreements 
The above-mentioned resolutions are at the apex of the international efforts to 
rebuild Afghanistan.  In terms of international law, the resolutions are binding although, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, the language of the resolutions is somewhat vague.  The 
Council‘s calls for recovery and reconstruction assistance are made in tandem with and, 
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according to the Council, are heavily reliant upon the implementation of a number of 
international agreements containing much of the detail underpinning reconstruction in 
Afghanistan. 
The Bonn Agreement: Transitioning towards Permanent Governance 
The Bonn Agreement created the agenda and process for the establishment of 
permanent governance institutions, representing a new level of commitment and political 
will by both Afghans and major powers (Johnson 2006). The agreements paved the way 
for the creation of a three-way partnership between the Afghan Transitional Authority, 
UNAMA, and ISAF. 
Amongst the wide range of issues covered by the Bonn Agreement was the 
interrelationship between economic and social recovery and international peace and 
security.  In paragraph 2, the participants to the Agreement urged the UN, the 
international community, particularly donor countries and multilateral institutions, to 
reaffirm, strengthen and implement their commitment to assist with the rehabilitation, 
recovery and reconstruction of Afghanistan, in coordination with the Interim Authority.  
For its part, the Security Council, in resolution 1471, stressed that the continued provision 
of focused recovery and reconstruction assistance could contribute significantly to the 
implementation of the Bonn Agreement and, to this end, urged bilateral and multilateral 
donors to coordinate closely with the SRSG and the Afghan Transitional Administration, 
in particular through the Afghan Consultative Group Process.  It reiterated its strong 
support for the full implementation of the Bonn Agreement.  It also supported, in 
resolution 1536, the objectives of the international conference which took place in Berlin 
from 31 March to 1 April 2004 to allow the Afghan authorities and the international 
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community to reaffirm their long-term commitment to take the transitional process in 
Afghanistan forward, including by demonstrating support for the Afghan political process 
and its national security, as well as by confirming and generating international financial 
and other donations.  In extending and supporting UNAMA‘s mandate, the Security 
Council, in resolution 1589 for example, continued to affirm its support for the 
implementation of the provisions of the Bonn Agreement and of the Berlin Declaration. 
However, the Bonn Agreement is not a ―peace agreement‖ between the parties to 
the internal conflict in Afghanistan.  Only the US-backed Northern Alliance was party to 
the Agreement (Johnson 2006).  As such, the Bonn Agreement is largely a political 
agreement with little or no clear legal undertakings.   
The Afghan Compact and the London and Kabul Communiqués: Sustaining 
International Cooperation 
The process outlined in the Bonn Agreement came to a formal end in 2005 with 
the completion of the Parliamentary and Provincial elections.  The Afghan Compact, the 
culmination of the 2006 London Conference on Afghanistan, was a successor to the Bonn 
process and established the framework for international cooperation with Afghanistan for 
the ensuing five years. The Compact was agreed to by the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan and the international community. Recognition of the interrelationship 
between peace, security and economic and social development can be seen in some of the 
Compact‘s preambular statements. According to the Compact, its parties expressed their: 
[Determination] to strengthen their partnership to improve the lives of 
Afghan people, and to contribute to national, regional, and global peace 
and security;  
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… 
[Resolve] to overcome the legacy of conflict in Afghanistan by setting 
conditions for sustainable economic growth and development; 
strengthening state institutions and civil society; removing remaining 
terrorist threats; meeting the challenge of counter-narcotics; rebuilding 
capacity and infrastructure; reducing poverty; and meeting basic human 
needs;… 
The Compact identified security; governance, rule of law and human rights; and 
economic and social development as three critical and interdependent areas or pillars of 
activity for the five years subsequent to its adoption. A further vital and cross-cutting area 
of work was the elimination of the narcotics industry, which remained a formidable threat 
to the people and state of Afghanistan, the region and beyond.  Under the terms of the 
Compact, the Afghan Government committed itself to realizing a shared vision of the 
future and the international community, for its part, committed itself to provide resources 
and support to realize that vision. 
Annex I of the Compact set out detailed outcomes, benchmarks and timelines for 
delivery, consistent with the high-level goals set by the ANDS.  Annex I also identified a 
number of goals in the area of economic and social development.  The Afghan 
Government with the support of the international community agreed to pursue high rates 
of sustainable economic growth with the aim of reducing hunger, poverty and 
unemployment.  According to the Compact, public investments were to be structured 
around the six sectors of the pillar on economic and social development of the ANDS 
which are:  infrastructure and natural resources; education; health; agriculture and rural 
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development; social protection; and economic governance and private sector 
development. In each of these areas, the objective was to achieve measurable results 
towards the goal of equitable economic growth that would reduce poverty, expand 
employment and enterprise creation, enhance opportunities in the region and improve the 
well-being of all Afghans.  The Government and international community also committed 
themselves to improving the effectiveness and accountability of international assistance 
as set forth in Annex II.  For its part, the Security Council‘s support for the 
implementation of the Compact remained up until 2010 (UNSC res 1917), at which point 
continued support for the reconstruction of Afghanistan was reconstituted by both the 
international community and the Council to reflect the outcomes of the London 
Conference of January 2010.  The ensuing Communiqué of the London Conference 
continues the recognition by both the international community and Afghanistan of the 
formidable development challenges faced by the latter which require sustained, long-term 
support from the former (S/2010/65).  According to the Communiqué: 
Economic growth, respect for Rule of Law and human rights alongside 
creation of employment opportunities, and good governance for all 
Afghans are also critical to counter the appeal of the insurgency, as well as 
being vital to greater stability in Afghanistan. (S/2010/65, para. 16) 
The significance of economic and social development was reaffirmed in the 
subsequent Kabul Communiqué which noted the support of the international community 
for the Afghan Government‘s strategy of seeking to achieve fiscal independence through 
an effective mix of investment in critical infrastructure and the development of a skilled 
labor force and of a strong, value-adding agricultural sector.  It was noted that part of the 
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success of this strategy would depend upon initiatives such as public-private partnerships 
in social and economic development, through adequate regulatory and institutional 
reform.   
The disparity between statements of intent and subsequent action on the part of 
States and other donors raises an interesting question around the extent of States‘ 
international legal obligations in response to Security Council resolutions affirming the 
Bonn Agreement, the Afghan Compact, the London and Kabul Communiqués, and UN 
Charter obligations, more generally.  Early Security Council resolutions pertaining to 
Afghanistan indicate that the Bonn Agreement formed the core of the operation of the 
mandate.  However, the Agreement been described as neither a domestic agreement, an 
international treaty, nor a peace-treaty.  Consequently, whether the Agreement could 
create rights and obligations for the United Nations given that the Agreement was merely 
witnessed by the SRSG to Afghanistan has been questioned (Schoiswohl 2006; Report of 
the Secretary-General 2002; Bonn Agreement 2001).  Similarly, the theory of self-
determination, posited to elevate the Agreement to the level of other international 
agreements, has proven problematic as not all groups were adequately represented and, as 
a result, a collective exercise of the right to self-determination could not be exercised 
(Schoiswohl 2006).  
Accordingly, it has been argued that that the Bonn Agreement does not qualify as 
an enforceable international agreement so that those provisions that relate to the United 
Nations should be only interpreted as a declaration concerning the latter's mandate in the 
political reconstruction of Afghanistan. The affirmation of the Bonn Agreement by the 
Security Council, in Resolution 1358, would have been unnecessary if the Bonn 
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Agreement could be regarded as an international agreement between the United Nations 
and ―Afghanistan‖ represented by the participants to the Bonn talks (Schoiswohl 2006).  
Similar analysis can be applied to the Afghan Compact and the subsequent 
Communiqués.  Following this view, the assistance provided by donors is not imposed, at 
least technically, but provided on the basis of the normative framework of the type 
originally enshrined in the Bonn Agreement.  The converse of this analysis is the 
obligation imposed by upon all Member States by Article 2(5) of the Charter to give the 
United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter.  
Overall, it would appear that the legally binding, although vaguely worded, Security 
Council resolutions are dependent upon non-binding legal agreements pledging financial 
support.  This situation raises some questions around the ability of the Council to meet its 
mandate which may have particular legal consequences for its initial and on-going armed 
intervention, jus ad bellum, in Afghanistan more generally.  This type of scenario raises 
questions more generally regarding jus ad bellum and peace support operations if the goal 
of the intervention is difficult or even impossible to determine, achieve or sustain. 
Constructing Peace and Security: Stabilization and Development  
Mandates and the Military 
The peace support operation in Afghanistan is evidence of a more balanced 
institutional approach aimed at simultaneously advancing recovery in governance, 
security, justice and reconciliation, and socio-economic development (Rietjens, Bollen, 
Khalil, and Fazlullah Wahidi 2009).   It has resulted in a greater convergence between 
military and non-military tasks so that military forces have been playing an increasing 
role in the conduct of humanitarian and development missions, previously regarded as 
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being the domain of civilian actors, because of the immediate needs of the situation 
(Ryan 2007/08; MacNerney 2005/06; Freeman 2007).  ISAF is conducting immediate 
and longer-term stabilization operations either simultaneously with, or in rapid 
succession to, security operations. Perhaps the most obvious aim of such stabilization 
operations is the fulfillment of the Chapter VII peace enforcement mandate.  However, 
such operations also aim to establish a secure environment in which local, domestic and 
international actors, such as UNAMA, can operate. 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams: The Front Line in Securing Economic and Social 
Reconstruction 
ISAF established Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), consisting of military 
and civilian personnel, throughout Afghanistan to carry out stabilization and 
reconstruction and development activities. Neither NATO nor ISAF have control over the 
orientation and work of the PRTs.  Each PRT reports to its own national authorities and 
they tend to reflect the priorities of their troop contributing nations, which often leads to 
coordination problems and inefficient development assistance (Kouvo 2009). According 
to the UN Secretary-General, as the number of PRTs increases, as well as the number of 
countries involved in them, issues of consistency and coordination with the Afghan 
Government and the international community are increasingly relevant. Therefore, 
special attention ought to be paid to ensuring that a unified vision and common policy are 
implemented countrywide (A/58/742-S/2004/230; Tiersky 2009).  PRTs assist ISAF‘s 
overall goal of assisting the Afghan authorities to establish and strengthen those 
institutions whose role it is to effect good governance, rule of law and the promotion of 
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human rights. Development advisors are also embedded within the PRTs, Regional 
Commands and ISAF Headquarters (NATO March 2010; NATO 2008; S/2003/1212).  
In practical terms, PRTs provide area security and support for the reconstruction 
and development efforts of local, national and international actors.  On the one hand, the 
PRTs‘ civilian components have responsibility for political, economic, humanitarian and 
social matters. On the other hand, the PRTs‘ military components focus on increasing 
security and stability in the area and building security sector capacity. The PRTs‘ military 
components are also responsible for directing assistance to the civilian elements, in 
particular at the levels of transport, medical assistance and engineering, thus 
demonstrating the intertwined nature of military and civilian operators.  Overall, various 
kinds of projects are underway, facilitated by the NATO-ISAF PRTs.  As the work of the 
NZ PRT below indicates, schools are being rebuilt with the mentoring or assistance of 
ISAF engineers, allowing children to resume their education; irrigation ditches, pipelines, 
reservoirs and wells are being constructed to bring water to the local population and 
farmers; infrastructure is being repaired and/or built to facilitate mobility and 
communication; and local people are provided with greater access to medical assistance.  
Upon request, ISAF PRTs are assisting the Afghan Government and international actors 
with humanitarian relief.  In particular, ISAF soldiers have launched several relief 
missions, distributing medication, food and winter supplies to help villagers cope with 
severe weather conditions in different parts of the country (NATO March 2010; Malley 
2007; Bosi 2003).  
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The NZ PRT: The Reality of Stabilization and Development 
New Zealand Defence Force personnel began working in Afghanistan following 
United Nations resolutions adopted after 11 September 2001.  From the perspective of 
domestic law, New Zealand‘s presence derives from s 5 of the Defence Force Act 1990 
which provides: 
The Governor-General may from time to time, in the name and on behalf 
of the Sovereign, continue to raise and maintain armed forces, either in 
New Zealand or elsewhere, for the following purposes: 
(a) the defence of New Zealand, and of any area for the defence of which 
New Zealand is responsible under any Act: 
(b) the protection of the interests of New Zealand, whether in New 
Zealand or elsewhere: 
(c) the contribution of forces under collective security treaties, 
agreements, or arrangements: 
(d) the contribution of forces to, or for any of the purposes of, the United 
Nations, or in association with other organisations or States and in 
accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations: 
(e) the provision of assistance to the civil power either in New Zealand or 
elsewhere in time of emergency: 
(f) the provision of any public service.  
New Zealand has maintained a PRT in Bamyan Province since September 
2003. Originally, the NZ PRT was originally part of New Zealand‘s contribution 
to OEF.  Since November 2006, the NZ PRT has operated under the command of 
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ISAF.  As with all deployments, the Chief of Defence Force maintains full 
command of the NZ PRT.  Operational command of deployed NZDF personnel is 
the responsibility of the Commander Joint Forces New Zealand.  New Zealand 
also has personnel serving in ISAF headquarters and UNAMA.  
The NZ PRT comprises four Liaison teams which facilitate aid efforts, 
monitor disarmament and assist in the reconstruction of Afghan institutions, 
including education facilities (NZDF October 2010). The provision of security 
and stability to facilitate the deliverance of government assistance, capacity 
building, and governance improvements has been a primary purpose.  In 2009, the 
head of New Zealand‘s PRT in Bamyan readily acknowledged that security was 
only part of the mission: 
We are heavily focused on development and more recently governance. 
The NZPRT is in the middle of a $US40m ‗development surge‘ with the 
priorities on roads, health and education infrastructure. This money is 
being supplied by the US military, with meaningful contributions from 
NZAID, USAID and Singapore. Significantly, the delivery is all Kiwi led 
... Winning the people over is what will win this war; this means 
improving the lives of Afghans.‖ (NZDF October 2009, 6). 
In terms of assisting with governance, the NZ PRT has established relationships 
with the Afghan regional leadership to monitor and co-ordinate activities in order to 
strengthen the influence of the Government and marginalize regional causes of instability 
(NZDF October 2010).  Such support manifests itself at the provincial and local 
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government in the provision of advice and assistance to the Provincial Governor, the 
Afghan National Police and district sub-governors.    
Physical, social and economic reconstruction has been a joint effort.  An 
American military contingent, which has access to funding from the US Commanders 
Emergency Response Program (CERP), has also been assigned to the NZ PRT. Together, 
they are responsible for timely project delivery, quality and cost while adhering to and 
maintaining national guidelines. New Zealand‘s PRT has introduced a robust 
Development Plan that includes Terms of Reference for Sector Working Group 
representatives to ensure it meets both mission and local expectations.  The combined 
personnel are heavily involved in major road infrastructure, health and education 
programs and have jointly facilitated the successful delivery of over 600 projects since 
the deployment of the NZ PRT (Breen 2009; Fletcher 2009).  The NZ PRT has assisted in 
the rebuilding of Bamyan‘s physical infrastructure by identifying, preparing and 
providing project management for NZAID projects within the region.  These projects 
have provided both employment and new amenities in the region because they are 
contracted to Afghan companies that hire local workers, thus contributing to economic 
reconstruction in the area (NZDF October 2010; Breen 2009).  
In addition to its work on the re-building of Bamyan Province‘s physical 
infrastructure, the NZ PRT has had a particular impact on some basic social 
(re)development with regard to health, education and security (NZDF October 2009).  As 
of 2009, 83 percent of Afghans had access to basic healthcare, up from just eight percent 
in 2002 (NZDF June 2009). In Bamyan province the provision of basic health care is a 
combined effort between the NZ PRT and United States‘ military personnel. The US 
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military initiated the organization of clinics so that people in remote areas of the war-
ravaged province could access medical checks, and have their animals treated, dosed and 
vaccinated at the same time.  In addition to providing security for the clinics, the NZ PRT 
team includes nurses and medics. Together with their US counterparts, as well as US 
veterinarians, the NZ PRT personnel have run all-day multi-purpose clinics in several 
remote villages that otherwise possess few or no medical facilities (Breen 2009). In this 
regard, the NZ PRT‘s policy has been broad, seeing as many people and animals as 
possible, and, where possible, providing them with medical treatment or advice and 
referring some people to hospitals and dental facilities in Kabul or Bagram.  Cattle, 
donkeys, horses, sheep and have been vaccinated and dewormed, and dogs have been 
given rabies vaccinations (NZDF July 2004). Malnourishment has been a major medical 
problem in the Bamyan area. At the local hospital more than two thirds of the inpatient 
pediatric admissions have been from (often very serious) malnourishment alone. 
According to New Zealand Army nurse Captain Georgina Parata-Turvey: 
Hopefully, when the area where we are based becomes stable, and life for 
the local population returns to some sense of normality, with jobs 
returning to the local economy and things as simple as being able to grow 
crops and raise livestock happen without them being ‗requisitioned‘ by the 
Taliban, the level of malnutrition will decrease. (NZDF July 2004, 5) 
In 2009, Afghanistan had thirteen state universities, eight other state institutions 
of higher education, and a dozen private universities in which 20 per cent of the students 
were female (NZDF October 2009). At a provincial level, Bamyan Boys‘ School was 
built with the assistance of the NZ PRT which helped with planning, the organization of 
Peace and Conflict Studies 
Volume 18, Number 2 
214 
contractors and the allocation of $500,000 worth of funds provided by NZAID (Breen 
2009; NZDF 2006).   According to New Zealand contingent commander, Group Captain 
Kevin Short, the boys‘ school ―is a very visible and tangible example of progress towards 
a positive future for the people of Bamyan‖ as education was key to the success of 
Afghanistan as a country (NZDF December 2006). 
Social redevelopment has also seen members of the NZ PRT engaged in 
mentoring and teaching roles. In 2007, for example, the NZ PRT approved sponsorship 
for a four-day Strategic Working Group with the intention of allowing Bamyan‘s Director 
of Education and the Province‘s District Directors to meet together to learn about 
strategic planning and to assist the Provincial Director in preparing a draft Provincial 
Education Plan.  The Provincial Director and his staff were also mentored in preparation 
and delivery.  At the completion of the Working Group meeting all objectives had been 
achieved and attendees were united in their appreciation of the experience.  Both the 
organization of the meeting by the NZ PRT and the meeting itself constitute a further 
strand and practical demonstration of reconstruction as local leaders are prepared to 
assume responsibility for the development and outputs of their departments (Breen 2009; 
Smith 2007).   
One of the New Zealand Government‘s key areas of assistance in Afghanistan 
relates to the Afghan National Police (ANP) (Martin 2006). In this regard, New Zealand 
Police have worked very closely with the NZ PRT with day-to-day activities for police 
personnel consisting of training, coaching or mentoring, facilitating the provision of 
equipment and infrastructure, restructuring, pay-roll, rank reform and other specialist 
project work.  By 2007, much progress (albeit slow) and many notable achievements had 
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been made in training and equipping the ANP which had resulted in a definite 
improvement in the overall capability and competence of the ANP within Bamyan 
Province.  A fully functional Regional Training Centre had produced over 2,000 trainees 
with 1,600 of these trainees returning to their police districts within the Province. The 
new Bamyan Provincial Police Headquarters building was almost finished, good progress 
was being made on pay-roll reform and the ANP restructure ‗the Tashkil‘ was underway 
(Breen 2009; Edghill 2007). These successes stemmed from earlier work by the NZ PRT 
including an NZAID-funded literacy program as illiteracy had been identified as one of 
the biggest challenges facing Afghan police.  In addition, capacity in the local force was 
further supported by the instruction of local trainers by the NZ PRT (Breen 2009; Martin 
2006).   
Strengthening security and reconstruction of physical infrastructure saw the 
provision of seven new police vehicles to the local police by NZAID, the building of five 
new stations and the occurrence of several other smaller policing-related projects 
throughout the province. The NZ PRT was charged with training an effective traffic 
police force in Bamyan province.  The extent of the required training was described by 
Group Captain Howse who observed that, ―[F]or many of the people we are training, 
donkeys have been their main form of transport, so we have to start from scratch with 
vehicles‖ (NZDF July 2004, 3).  Using two of its own Toyota Hiluxs which it donated to 
the Bamyan police to use as training vehicles, the NZ PRT trained the local police in 
vehicle maintenance, driver evaluation and driver training, basic road rules, driving so as 
to avoid damage to the vehicle by the roads and how to reverse a vehicle accurately.  The 
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police were instructed in vehicle checkpoint drills, skills which local police need to help 
maintain security in the local area (Breen 2009; NZDF July 2004). 
The intended impact of such hands-on activities in terms of physical, economic 
and social reconstruction finds expression in the views of Air Force engineer Squadron 
Leader Shane Meighan: 
We‘re trying to build capacity, to get the local council to support itself, 
and take care of its own planning and decision making. We‘re here to help 
them develop the skills to be self-governing. Ultimately we should do 
ourselves out of a job here I hope. That‘s our aim. (Martin 2006) 
The role of the NZ PRT has also been described as one of giving effect to the 
Afghan Government and ISAF‘s aim of establishing a secure environment.  That such an 
approach requires a long term view of security can be seen in the comments of the former 
Deputy Chief of Plans at the Headquarters of ISAF, Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy Ramsden, 
who stated: 
Security improvements occur when the population sees growth in 
governance capacity and tangible development effort. Winning the people 
over is what will win this war; this means improving the lives of Afghans. 
(Ramsden 2009, 2)  
The Deputy Chief was also of the opinion that the challenge for Afghanistan was 
to integrate the security line of operation (ISAF) with the governance responsibility (the 
Afghan Government) and development (United Nations) lines to produce a combined 
effect. He was of the opinion that for ISAF‘s part this meant genuine engagement, 
showing ―operational patience,‖ understanding the long game, and positioning for it. An 
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integrated approach to security would require the Afghan Government to extend 
appropriate governance and to deal with corruption. The integrated approach would 
require the UN Mission to fulfill the basis for its establishment and to giving effect to its 
mandate responsibilities (Breen 2009; Ramsden 2009).  
As the previous paragraphs demonstrate, the necessities of reconstruction have 
frequently drawn ISAF and the NZ PRT into activities that go well beyond their 
originally intended missions of providing direct security, including the delivery of 
essential services such as health care, education, or food.  From the perspective of the 
military forces, the destruction or defeat of the enemy should remain the key goal.  Many 
military forces may argue that they are not the appropriate actors to be performing non-
security related tasks on the basis that the performance of such tasks may lead to: a 
dilution of the central role and motivation of the military which is warfighting; an 
overstretching of increasing limited military resources; an overlapping of responsibilities 
with civilian operators such as NGOs engaged in humanitarian assistance resulting in 
confusion and tensions between both sets of operators.  NGOs may not welcome the 
input or assistance of the military which the former may regard as inflexible and a threat 
to the need to appear impartial amongst the local population.  The overall outcome may 
be unrealistic and result in unmet expectations on the part of the local populace (Ryan 
2007; Wing 2000), which serves neither the military nor the non-military operators.  
Increasingly, the reality is that complex peace support operations are deployed to many 
areas where tenuous security conditions prevent humanitarian organizations, which may 
be deliberately targeted by insurgents, from establishing a presence. In such situations, 
the debate on specific domains becomes less relevant, and military involvement in non-
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military activities is necessary to provide a temporary gap and gain momentum for 
reaching the primary military goal: the creation of stability (Rietjens 2009).  The 
achievement of this goal in turn facilitates the destruction of the enemy, the key and 
traditional goal of the military forces.  
However, the blurring of military and non-military roles and the increased co-
operation with domestic governmental and non-governmental actors, as well as 
international governmental actors raises the question of ―ungoverned spaces‖ in 
international law.  
International Law and Stabilization and Development Mandates in Afghanistan: 
Plenty of Policies but what about the Law? 
Interventions by international organizations such as the UN and NATO, and their 
on-going presence in Afghanistan, pose some challenges for jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello. As part of any consideration of the, arguably open-ended, relationship between the 
legal objectives for intervention and the manner by which those objectives are achieved, 
it might be useful to consider some of the policy-based and legal complexities impacting 
upon the current international presences in Afghanistan  
Peacebuilding: A New Policy for an Old Problem? 
In An Agenda for Peace, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali stated that in order 
for peacemaking and peacekeeping operations to be truly successful, such operations had 
to include efforts both to identify and to support structures that would consolidate peace 
and advance a sense of confidence and well-being (A/55/305-S/2000/809).  Similarly, the 
Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure 
World, stated that, ―[R]esources spent on implementation of peace agreements and 
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peacebuilding are one of the best investments that can be made for conflict prevention - 
States that have experienced civil war face a high risk of recurrence‖ (A/59/565, para. 
221).  Furthermore, the High Level Panel was of the view that: 
Along with establishing security, the core task of peacebuilding is to build 
effective public institutions that, through negotiations with civil society, 
can establish a consensual framework for governing within the rule of law. 
Relatively cheap investments in civilian security through police, judicial 
and rule-of-law reform, local capacity-building for human rights and 
reconciliation, and local capacity-building for public sector service 
delivery can greatly benefit long-term peacebuilding. This should be 
reflected in the policies of the United Nations, international financial 
institutions and donors, and should be given priority in long- term policy 
and funding. (A/59/565, para. 229) 
Similarly, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the 
Brahimi Report) identified the way in which the UN had conceived of, funded and 
implemented peace-building strategies and activities as being a fundamental deficiency.  
It not only laid out a clear peace-building strategy in an effort to bridge the chasm 
between the development and the conflict management sides of the UN (Griffin 2003), it 
also called for clear, credible and achievable mandates for peacekeeping (A/55/305 - 
S/2000/809; Breau 2006).  Similarly, the link between poverty reduction, economic 
growth and conflict prevention was identified in the UN‘s Millennium Report 
(A/54/2000) and the theme was further expanded upon by the International Commission 
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on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). In its report, the Responsibility to Protect, 
the ICISS stated:   
Too often the responsibility to rebuild had been insufficiently recognized 
and the exit of the intervention poorly managed with the underlying 
problems causing the conflict left unresolved.  In addition to the more 
obvious aspects of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the 
armed, other aspects of post-conflict activity were the necessity for justice, 
reconciliation and economic growth. (ICISS 2001, para.5.2) 
According to the ICISS: 
True and lasting reconciliation occurs with sustained daily efforts at 
repairing infrastructure, at rebuilding housing, at planting and harvesting, 
and cooperating in other productive activities. External support for 
reconciliation efforts must be conscious of the need to encourage this 
cooperation, and dynamically linked to joint development efforts between 
former adversaries. (ICISS 2001, para. 5.4)  
Collectively, these reports constitute a rethinking of international policy. 
International interventions must now deal with harsh realities such as violent attacks, 
badly broken infrastructure, mounting frustration with occupiers over insecurity, lack of 
basic services, and unemployment (Rudderham (2007/08). Neglecting health, education 
and other needs of the civilian population may not only entrench dependency on external 
aid and render the population less capable of recovering from war but it may also 
increase the likelihood of a resumption of conflict. Consequently, the view has developed 
that humanitarian and conflict management operations must be linked, so that longer-
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term, locally-driven, capacity-building development interventions must take root 
alongside the expensive, large-scale, short-term, externally driven humanitarian 
interventions responses to that typify the initial response to crises (Breen 2009; Griffin 
2003).  Although such policy initiatives are to be welcomed, there remains the question 
of how such policies impact on the law which underpins the deployment of peace support 
operations, and within which the distinction between military and non-military roles are 
blurred. 
Jus ad bellum  
As Security Council resolutions indicate, ISAF‘s presence is in response to the 
on-going threat to international peace and security posed by the situation in Afghanistan.  
Responding to that threat is the legal basis for the collective security response embodied, 
in this case, in the peace enforcement operation.  UNAMA‘s role is one of assisting 
Afghanistan to transition from conflict to sustainable peace. It is not a Chapter VII action.  
Rather, it falls under the broader principles surrounding the maintenance of international 
peace and security as enshrined in the Charter, particularly in Chapter VI.  The Council‘s 
endorsement of the Bonn Agreement, the Afghan Compact and subsequent 
Communiqués and its more recent recognition of the synergies between the mandates of 
ISAF and UNAMA, in renewing ISAF‘s mandate under Chapter VII, are evidence of jus 
ad bellum, or a collective security response, based not only on military responses to a 
threat to the peace.  Such endorsement is also evidence of a collective security response 
which appears to be incorporating non-military responses to deal with that threat (Stahn 
2006).  Post-conflict reconstruction is not a novel concept.  The relationship between 
peace and security and economic and social reconstruction and development can be 
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traced back to the early years of the UN and the immediate aftermath of WWII.  
However, much of the focus on reconstruction and development takes place in a post-
conflict context (A/59/565).   
In many ways, the intervention in Afghanistan is following the UN blueprint for 
peace support identified from Agenda to Peace onwards.  However, the pacification and 
stabilization efforts are running concurrently with economic and social development, 
indeed the latter are part of the stabilization process.   The Security Council mandates 
underpinning ISAF suggest an evolution in collective security where intervention remains 
to be justified by a long-term, effective plan to deal to the threat that triggered the initial 
armed intervention. The evolution of collective security practice poses interesting 
questions regarding the nature and extent of the obligations placed upon the UN, troop 
contributing nations and the international community to counter the threat to peace and 
security that formed, and continues to form, the legal basis for peace enforcement in 
Afghanistan.     
Jus in bello 
The evolution of collective security also raises difficulties for the operation of 
such policies by States and peacekeepers within the current confines of IHL. Currently 
there exists an on-going armed conflict between Afghan Government forces (supported 
by ISAF), on the one hand, and insurgent Taliban forces (a non-state actor), on the other. 
Despite the presence of ISAF, this conflict is classified as a non-international armed 
conflict (Engdahl 2008).  Consequently, ISAF (and the Afghan forces) is required to 
comply with, at a minimum, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions relating to 
certain minimum standards of humane treatment that are applicable instances of armed 
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conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High 
Contracting Parties.  Additional Protocol II may also be applicable but only where a troop 
contributing nation has ratified that treaty.  This requirement presents one of a number of 
difficulties in trying to create a cohesive body of international law (Kouvo 2009) given 
that the United States, for example, has not ratified the Protocol but New Zealand has.  
According to the Secretary-General, as the number of PRTs increase, as well as the 
number of countries involved in them, issues of consistency and coordination with the 
Government and the international community are increasingly relevant. Special attention 
should be paid to ensuring that a unified vision and common policy are implemented 
countrywide (A/58/742-S/2004/230).  
Customary international law seeks to plug some of the gaps in IHL that regulate 
non-international conflicts.  Both Common Article 3 and a number of provisions of APII 
are now regarded as to be part of customary international law. The ICJ has affirmed that 
the provisions of common Article 3 reflect customary international law and represent a 
minimum standard from which the parties to any type of armed conflict must not depart 
(Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, 1986).  With regards to 
APII, among the acts governed by customary international law are the: prohibition of 
attacks on civilians; obligation to respect and protect medical and religious personnel, 
medical units and transports; obligation to respect the fundamental guarantees of persons 
who are not taking a direct part, or who have ceased to take a direct part, in hostilities; 
obligation to search for and respect and protect the wounded and sick (and shipwrecked); 
obligation to protect persons deprived of their liberty; prohibition of the forced movement 
Peace and Conflict Studies 
Volume 18, Number 2 
224 
of civilians; and specific protection for women and children (Henckaerts and Doswald-
Beck 2005). 
The impact of IHL upon peace enforcement operations is somewhat awkward, 
however. The UN is not party to any IHL treaties, although there appears to be little 
doubt but that the provisions of humanitarian law that have customary status do apply to 
UN forces (Murphy 2003).  The UN is not capable of following IHL, which is State-
centric, in its entirety. Chapter VII authorizes use of force which would suggest that the 
rules of IHL should govern the conduct of peace enforcement operations but such 
operations do not easily sit within the framework of internal conflict law and do not sit at 
all within the ‗inter-state‘ framework of international law (Engdahl 2008).  Thus, the 
positive obligations regarding the protection of civilians, for example, would appear to 
apply to combatants but not peacekeepers or enforcers (Murphy 2003).  
According to Article 1.1 of the Secretary-General‘s Bulletin on the Observance by 
United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, the fundamental principles 
and rules of IHL set out in the Bulletin are applicable to UN forces when in situations of 
armed conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the 
duration of their engagement (Engdahl 2008).  The Bulletin contains detailed guidance on 
Geneva law issues relative to the treatment and protection of civilians, detainees, and 
wounded and sick combatants.  It also contains detailed guidance on Hague law issues 
relative to the means and methods of combat. The approach of the Secretary-General was 
based on the premise that peace enforcement operations could not be categorized as 
traditional armed conflict. The legal status of this Bulletin is debatable but it does provide 
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a foundation for legal advisors, commanders and civil authorities tasked to implement 
peace enforcement operations (Hoffman 2000). 
Article 2(2) of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated 
Personnel states that the:  
Convention shall not apply to a United Nations operation authorized by 
the Security Council as an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations in which any of the personnel are engaged 
as combatants against organized armed forces and to which the law of 
international armed conflict applies.  
This view would suggest that the mere presence of United Nations peacekeeping 
soldiers in an area of conﬂict or a theatre of war, while performing a humanitarian or 
diplomatic mission, does not necessarily mean that humanitarian law binds these troops 
(Murphy 2003) and they are entitled to the status of civilians under IHL and the legal 
rights and obligations that ensue.  This view is consonant with a prima facie reading of 
the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols and, arguably, clarifies the legal 
status of UNAMA personnel.  For the purposes of the Safety Convention, the status 
change as between combatant and civilian reflects the same conditions for civilians in 
general (Engdahl 2008). The Secretary-General also noted that the express reference to 
the laws regulating international conflict, ―gives rise to the suggestion that enforcement 
actions carried out in situations of internal armed conflict (UNOSOM II type of 
operations) are included within the scope of the Convention and subject to its protective 
regime‖ (A/55/637 2000, 9 (fn. 3)). He concluded, however, that it was not the nature or 
character of the conflict that should determine whether the Convention or IHL applied 
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but whether, ―in any type of conflict, members of United Nations peacekeeping 
operations are actively engaged therein as combatants, or are otherwise entitled to the 
protection given to civilians under the international law of armed conflict‖ (A/55/637 
2000, 9 (fn. 3)).  
The preceding paragraphs are illustrative some of current legal complexities and 
potential loopholes in the law.  Restricting the rules binding parties to Common Article 3 
or to APII clearly overlooks the international dimension to the conflict (Murphy 2003).  
Moreover, ISAF troops may be combatants engaged in conﬂict and, thus, subject to 
broader IHL rules when they are acting as members of national armed forces.  The same 
troops, and/or other members of armed forces in the same armed conﬂict, when they are 
not engaged in combat but are acting as peacekeepers are exempted from IHL obligations 
to respect the rights of protected persons (Murphy 2003). The switch between non-
combatant and combatant status may serve to answer some of the questions as to rights 
and obligations of the combatant.  It may address the issue of the rights of the non-
combatant but it does not clearly address obligations of peace support personnel engaged 
in non-combatant roles, a range of activities neatly encapsulated in the role of the PRTs. 
It may be that the work of the PRTs are simply over and above the minimum standards 
provided for by Common Article 3 and APII, if such activities are carried out during the 
course of conflict.  
The question arises then as to which body of law are peace support personnel 
most appropriately subject to, in the international and domestic arenas, in the course of 
non-combat activities as some of the work of the NZ PRT would appear to be.  Arguably, 
such personnel may become subject to human rights law, in this case, the domestic laws 
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of New Zealand, with New Zealand, in turn, being governed by its obligations in the 
international sphere.  Currently, however, the application of human rights law to peace 
support personnel, especially with regard to activities arising from reconstruction and 
development, is a less than satisfactory approach.  Reconstruction and development 
activities are closely correlated to economic and social rights such as the rights to an 
adequate standard of living, health and education (Breen 2009).  However, accountability 
for a failure to achieve such rights is not easily resolved as some States, including New 
Zealand, strongly resist attempts to provide a judicial or quasi-judicial remedy for the 
breach of such rights (Breen 2008).  Moreover, the issue of accountability for the breach 
of economic and social rights is rife with more uncertainty as the issues of extraterritorial 
application of human rights treaties and responsibility (state or international) organization 
for breaches thereof remain to be traversed. 
The nature of conflict has changed.  More significantly, the collective security 
response embodied in the Charter sets out the pattern of potential responses.  The 
evolution of peace support operations, including the increased emphasis on economic and 
social development components, suggests an evolution in both jus ad bellum, as well as 
jus in bello.  However, only a small component of IHL, being the laws of occupation, was 
drafted with this type of activity in mind.  There remains rather a large gap in 
international treaty law as regards the issue of whether the military when participating in 
peace support operations are under any positive obligations such as a duty to build 
hospitals as opposed to the current IHL obligation to refrain from bombing hospitals.   
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Conclusion 
Peace support operations are a necessary but ad hoc response to breaches of 
international peace and security, or threats thereof.  Peace support operations operate 
under the umbrella of IHL which incorporates, in particular, Articles 1 and 2 and 
Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter, as well as the provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions and their Additional Protocols.   
Peace support operations are a manifestation of modern collective security 
measures as set out in the UN Charter and are indicative of an evolved jus ad bellum. 
ISAF and UNAMA, with their interrelated synergies and their reliance upon the Bonn 
Agreement, the Afghan Compact and later Communiqués are the legal and practical 
response to the requirements of the afore-mentioned Charter provisions.  The work of the 
PRTs demonstrates the blurring of the military and non-military roles designed to meet 
the objectives of ISAF and UNAMA.  The situation in Afghanistan is indicative of a 
peace enforcement operation based on an initial military response followed by an 
immediate military and civilian component, or a military and civilian component running 
concurrently.  Jus ad bellum seems to be incorporating a reconstruction and development 
response, either way. The broader functions of the military in peace support raises 
questions for jus in bello as States and their armed forces engage in stabilization and 
state-building initiatives, initiatives that are not easily incorporated into IHL.  
With regards to Afghanistan, a clear link between peace and security and 
stabilization and development exists and the link underpins the peace support operation.  
However, the extent of the legal obligations incurred is not clear as the mandates are 
vague.  On a more positive note, it would appear that the international community in 
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Afghanistan is seeking to follow quite closely the peace-building strategy outlined by the 
UN over the past two decades.  However, the manner in which such a strategy fits into 
the framework of international law governing those who have undertaken the 
responsibility to effect the strategy remains unclear.  The legal consequences of these 
developments for IHL is unclear given that the latter was drafted largely to deal with 
inter-state conflict and, to a more limited extent, internal conflict.  The boundary between 
these categories is no longer clear in the context of peace support missions, especially 
those authorized under Chapter VII. As the work of the NZ PRT suggests, the nature of 
military roles is evolving as it increasingly engages economic and social reconstruction 
and development.   
This state of affairs raises the question of whether the international community 
needs (yet another) treaty, a further Additional Protocol to set some parameters for peace 
support operations.  Such a treaty might assist in drawing together a framework against 
which issues such as the extent of a State‘s obligations, the manner in which such 
objectives are to be met and how the international community, and troop contributing 
nations such as New Zealand knows that it has met its objectives.   
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